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Abstract
Common wisdom as well as sound analytical arguments suggest that stronger punishment of deviant behav-
ior meted out by a principal typically prompts the agents to better conform with his objectives. Addressing
the speciﬁc issue of donor-beneﬁciary relationships in the context of participatory development programs, we
nevertheless show that greater tolerance on the part of donors may, under certain conditions, favor rather than
hurt the interests of the poor. Also, greater uncertainty surrounding the donor’s knowledge regarding the poor’s
preference may have the same paradoxical eﬀect.
Critical features of our framework are: (i) communities are heterogeneous and dominated by the local elite
in dealing with external agencies, (ii) the elite choose the project proposed to the donor strategically, knowing
that the latter has a certain amount of tolerance toward elite capture and an imperfect knowledge of the poor’s
priorities.
Keywords: community-driven development, aid eﬀectiveness, elite capture, preference targeting, information dis-
tortion.
Centre of Research in the Economics of Development (CRED), Department of economics, University of Namur, Rempart de la
Vierge, 8 B-5000 Namur, Belgium. Corresponding author: J.-P. Platteau. Tel.: +3281724860; fax: +3281724840; e-mail address:
jean-philippe.platteau@fundp.ac.be.
yDepartment of International Development, University of Oxford, 3 MansÖeld Road, Oxford OX1 3TB, United Kingdom.
11 Introduction
Of late, following great disappointment with conventional aid approaches based on a hierarchical relationship
between donors and beneﬁciaries, there has been a growing emphasis within the international donor community
on the importance of ownership of aid budgets and decisions by the receiving agent. Such a move has been
reﬂected in the rapid emergence of decentralised or participatory development as a concept guiding aid strategies
and eﬀorts. Bilateral and multilateral agencies alike have thus given more importance to participation in the design
of their development assistance programmes, and have channeled substantial amounts of aid money through local
partner associations and municipalities or through Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The World Bank,
for example, has made the so-called Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach one of the cornerstones of
its Comprehensive Development Framework, as reﬂected in the World Development Report 2000/2001 devoted to
poverty alleviation. The share of Bank’s projects with some degree of “civil society” involvement thus increased
from 6 percent in the late 1980s to over 70 percent in 2006 (cited from Werker and Ahmed (2008), p. 75). On the
other hand, aid in the form of budget support to central governments has gained increasing currency, particularly
in the perspective of achieving the Millenium Development Goals. In some countries such as Tanzania, no less than
40% of the state budget is ﬁnanced by foreign aid.
It is a much boasted advantage of all decentralised aid programmes that the beneﬁciaries possess much more
precise information than an external donor about what people want and how best they can achieve their objectives.
In addition, their active participation in the aid process motivates them to exert eﬀort and contribute their own
resources to an aid project or programme.
A major problem nevertheless appears as soon as it is reckoned that populations are highly heterogeneous and
that local elites -at the level of the village, the municipality, the regional or central government- are often guided
by their selﬁsh interest. Because they often succeed in monopolising the attention of the donor community thanks
to their better education and greater exposure to the external world, they are typically in a position to speak on
behalf of the poor who are the intended beneﬁciaries of aid programmes (Esman and Uphoﬀ (1984); Bierschenk
et al. (2000); Kumar and Corbridge (2002); Platteau (2009)). In actuality, the poor often expect the village elite to
manage aid projects and to make their own interests predominate as a sort of remuneration for their leadership role
(Kumar and Corbridge (2002); Platteau and Abraham (2002); Platteau and Gaspart (2003)). To sum up, power
asymmetry between the elite and the commoners is bound to cause the preference of the former to prevail over
the preference of the latter, thereby giving rise to a problem of elite capture in the presence of strong preference
divergence between the two components of society.
This possibility has aroused much concern among social scientists during recent years. When adressing it,
economists often represent the local decision mechanism as a form of representative democracy with (probabilistic)
voting in which the poor, who have diﬀerent preferences from the rich, have a relatively small weight (see Bardhan
and Mookherjee (2000, 2005, 2006)). There is no clear-cut conclusion from this quickly expanding literature and the
empirical testing of its theoretical predictions (see Mansuri and Rao (2004, 2010); Platteau (2009) for recent surveys).
Diﬀerences in results may be partly explained by methodological diﬃculties and partly by genuine variations between
local environments. None the less, a general proposition that emerges from quite a few systematic empirical studies
is that in more socially and economically unequal village communities the participatory mechanism tends to unduly
favor the rich (Rosenzweig and Foster (2003); Galasso and Ravaillon (2005); Rao and Ibáñez (2005); Bardhan
et al. (2008); Araujo et al. (2008); Labonne and Chase (2009)). Economists have also recently analysed the impact
of participation on the eﬀectiveness of project outcomes and the distribution of beneﬁts, leading to sometimes
very contrasted conclusions (Chattopadhyay and Duﬂo (2004); Khwaja (2004); Besley et al. (2005); Reinikka and
Svensson (2005); Olken (2007); Banerjee et al. (2008); Bjorkman and Svensson (2009); Khwaja (2009)). Especially
worth singling out is the ﬁnding that better information of the ultimate beneﬁciaries regarding the nature of the
beneﬁts they can expect from an aid programme signiﬁcantly reduces the risk of aid embezzlement by the elite.
A moot problem that nevertheless remains concerns the very deﬁnition of the objectives of the programme.
Here, donors are confronted with a tricky dilemma: on the one hand, in participatory programmes this deﬁnitional
task is typically considered the prerogative of the target community but, on the other hand, it is vulnerable to the
risk of elite capture as has been argued above and well documented in the general literature (Chabal and Daloz
(1999); Bierschenk et al. (2000); Blair (2000); Bardhan (2002); Conning and Kevane (2002); de Haan et al. (2002);
Eversole (2003); Tembo (2003); Abraham and Platteau (2004); Platteau (2004); Nygren (2005); Ban et al. (2010)).
2In this paper, we want to probe into this issue by examining the case where the donor does not accept to ﬁnance a
project or a programme just because it has been presented to him by a potential beneﬁciary group (more precisely,
by the elite speaking on its behalf).
The donor allocates some resources with a view to forming an idea about the preference of the poor. This idea
is necessarily imprecise as in general the needs expressed by the poor do not necessarily correspond to the way they
are assessed by a benevolent rich. Futhermore, the needs of the poor tend to be highly location-speciﬁc, depending
on the particular environment in which they live. Finally, the poor do not easily express dissenting preferences in
the front of outsiders since outsiders are just passing while elite people are there to stay. Note that, if the donor
could easily gather a perfect information regarding the poor’s preferences (or needs), he could act in a centralised
manner.
On the other hand, the donor has some degree of tolerance regarding the extent to which a project (or pro-
gramme) may diﬀer from his own perception of what the poor need. If the local elite acting as representative of the
community propose a project which falls outside of this tolerance interval, the donor rejects it altogether. In our
context, this rebuttal is taken to mean that the donor refuses to establish a “partnership” relationship with that
community. The elite, who has no knowledge about the donor’s information regarding the real needs of the poor,
have a strategic choice to make which involves a trade-oﬀ between the probability of project acceptance by the
donor and the distance between the proposed project and that reﬂecting its own (elite’s) preference. If accepted,
a project is implemented according to plan: enforcement problems are assumed away. In many instances, indeed,
it is easier for a donor agency to check the proper execution of a project (especially so if it is embedded in visible
infrastructures) than to identify the poor’s preferences in the presence of severe power imbalances.1 How the above
trade-oﬀ is aﬀected by the donor’s outside option and the quality of the information he possesses about the poor’s
preferences is the major question that we want to dwell upon.
The problem is not as trivial as it may look at ﬁrst sight. One central, almost paradoxical, result of our foray is
that reduced tolerance on the part of the donor may hurt the interest of the poor and, conversely, greater tolerance
may end up better disciplining the elite. Far from being a mere curiosity, such a result may be actually obtained in
other contexts exhibiting the same basic informational structure as that used in this paper (see Putterman (1987);
Putterman and Skillman (1988)).
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we provide a short informal description of the context that
will be modeled, and we clarify and justify some key assumptions behind our modelling eﬀort. In Section 3, the
model is presented in detail, while in Section 4, the main analytical results are derived and discussed. Section 5
concludes.
2 Preliminary clariﬁcations
2.1 A description of the context
We begin by providing an informal description of the context to be modelled. The formal setup is described in the
next section. Since we are interested in the eﬀect of preference divergence in decentralised development programmes,
we focus our attention on heterogeneous communities. More precisely, we assume that a community is comprised
of two groups, the target group which the donor agency wants to support through an aid ﬂow, and the elite group.
In fact, the term ‘elite’ need not be interpreted in a restrictive sense. It may stand for the median voter, while the
target group represents minority groups or marginal sections of the population, such as women, low-caste people,
strangers, herders, etc. In line with the objective of poverty reduction or emancipation of weak groups, the donor’s
utility function duly reﬂects the interests of the target group. Towards that end, the donor relies on a participatory
process aimed at determining the nature of the needs of the target group. However, because the elite may interfere
with the consultation mechanism, an information gap subsists and prevents the donor from assessing with certainty
the genuine needs of this group. What the donor maximises, therefore, is the expected utility derived by the target
group from the aid ﬂow. The decision to be taken is simply to accept or refuse to ﬁnance a project submitted by
1If the project proposed by the elite is accepted by the donor, we are in the situation described by a village chief from Burkina Faso:
“if I give you a hen free, you won’t start examining the ass to determine whether it is fat or thin. You just accept it.” (Guéneau and
Lecomte (1998), p. 100).
3the community (in fact, by the elite group). If the proposed project is refused, then the available funds can be
considered for alternative projects, perhaps in a diﬀerent community and probably involving a diﬀerent elite group.
These alternatives reﬂect the donor’s outside option.
The elite inﬂuence the participatory process in a decisive manner, and choose the project to submit to the
donor’s approval with the purpose of maximising their own selﬁsh utility. This involves a trade-oﬀ between two
kinds of considerations: on the one hand, the elite would like a project that is as close as possible to their own
preference; on the other hand, proposing a project that deviates from what the donor perceives as being most
beneﬁcial for the target group, lowers the likelihood that it will be approved by the donor.
Although numerous types of projects can obviously be carried out in the community, we keep our analysis as
simple as possible by assuming that the aid fund is to be split between only two projects, named A and B. Preference
heterogeneity is represented by the assumption that the elite and the target groups prefer diﬀerent mixes of the two
projects.
In order to keep our focus on the issue of strategic manipulation of preferences, we abstract away from any
problem arising at the level of enforcement of the project once approved. In other words, the elite has no possibility
to embezzle the aid fund or to modify the nature or the destination of the project. It is easy to understand that
if the project, once accepted, could not be enforced by the donor, the trade-oﬀ at the heart of the problem of
elite capture through preference distortion would vanish, and the prediction derived from our analytical framework
would be straightforward. As a matter of fact, if the donor is unable to monitor the use of the disbursed funds,
the elite would propose the project that stands the best chance of being accepted by the donor and would actually
implement their own preferred project.
2.2 Key assumptions
Some assumptions underlying our modelling eﬀort and set-up need further clariﬁcation and justiﬁcation.
To begin with, we take decentralised aid as given in the sense that we do not explore the question as to why
and when it is superior to centralized aid (on this aspect, see Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000)). What amount
of information is available to the donor is only one factor determining the relative advantage of decentralised aid
compared to centralized aid (ownership of aid, for example, has several beneﬁcial eﬀects that may not all be related
to information). However, by positing that aid is decentralised (a common pattern of aid distribution nowadays),
we implicitly and realistically assume that the donor’s actual and potential knowledge about the preferences of local
people or groups is limited.
Our second point concerns the dichotomous nature of the donor’s decision. Since this is a key feature of our
model, it is important to stress the kind of situation that we have in mind. The issue in which we are interested
is the screening task which a donor organisation must perform when it is overwhelmed by a ﬂurry of project
proposals emanating from potential “partner” communities, municipalities, or other forms of local governments in
poor countries.2 Once a proposal is accepted, the donor organisation establishes a partnership relationship with
the community or local government concerned. A negotiation may then start with a view to making more precise
(i) the methods and the timing for the execution of the agreed-upon project (the project proposed by the partner
and accepted by the donor); (ii) the process of disbursement of aid money ; and (iii) the follow-up, monitoring, and
evaluation of the project. All these operations are not modelled since we want to keep the focus on the partner
selection issue.
Let us now turn to our third clariﬁcation. In the model, the elite choose which project to submit to the donor.
Because the donor will either accept or reject the proposal, and since the project is implemented as planned if it is
accepted, the elite’s proposal determines the payoﬀs of both agents. This feature of the game makes it intrinsically
diﬀerent from “cheap talk” games (Crawford and Sobel (1982) and the following literature) where, by deﬁnition,
the message has no implication for the future game except in the manner that it is interpreted by the players. If
the recommendation is too far-fetched, then the donor will be compelled to reject it. By contrast, in a cheap-talk
game, if the sender sends an implausible signal, then the receiver would simply ignore it.3 Whether the donor could
2It is not rare, as we could observe from our own involvement with NGOs, that aid organisations may receive tens of proposals in a
week.
3The same point can be made regarding the so-called “biased experts” problem, which is actually derived from the “cheap talk
literature”, as discussed by Austen-Smith (1994); Krishna and Morgan (2001, 2004) among others. In this framework, too, the advice
4be better oﬀ by revealing his signal about the poor’s preference to the elite, is an interesting question which is
addressed when we start solving the model.
Four, even if they have information regarding the poor’s preferences, donors are usually not able to fully assess
the magnitude of the divergence between the poor’s and the elite’s preferences. Moreover, donors often do not have
the means to assess the sincerity of a group that claims to represents the interest of the poor. To take this into
account, we assume that the donor’s perception of the needs of the poor and the elite’s preference are independent.
For example, if the donor thinks that the poor prefer project A, this does not give him any information on wether
the elite prefers project A or project B. And vice versa, the fact the elite prefers project A does not give the elite
any information on the donor’s perception of the poor’s needs. In our understanding, what the elite do is not
potentially informative for the donor. An approach using Bayesian updating of the donor’s beliefs on the basis of
the project proposed by the elite is therefore ruled out.
Five, in order not to add another source of uncertainty to our problem, the outside option of the donor is
assumed to be known by the elite.
3 The model
3.1 Setup
Formally, we analyse a game consisting of two agents represented by the letters D (the donor agency) and E (the
elite group).
A project mix (henceforth called simply a ‘project’) is a variable  2 [0;1] which indicates the share of the aid
fund allocated to project A. We let e denote the preferred project of the elite group, and t that of the target
group. In addition, D receives a signal s 2 [0;1] which is correlated with t and unobserved by E. Speciﬁcally, we
assume that s and t have a joint distribution described by the joint cumulative distribution function F (s;t)
and e is distributed according to the function G(e). The functions F (:) and G(:) are common knowledge; but E
observes only the realisations of e and t and D observes only the realisation of s.
The precise steps in the game are speciﬁed below.
1. Nature draws e;t;s. We have e and t revealed to E and s revealed to D.
2. E proposes a project, r 2 [0;1] which is revealed to D.
3. D must choose to accept or decline the recommended project. The decision is represented by the variable
a 2 fy;ng
If the recommended project is accepted (i.e. a = y), then D receives a payoﬀ of Ud (jr   tj), and E receives a
payoﬀ of Ue (jr   ej). If the project is rejected, then D receives U
d and E receives U
e.
Thus, if the recommended project is approved, then the utility of the donor depends on the ‘distance’ between
the approved project and that preferred by the target group; similarly, the utility of the elite group depends on
the ‘distance’ between the approved project and its own preferred project. The constants U
d and U
e represent the
outside options of the donor and the elite group respectively.
We assume that the utility functions Ud (:) and Ue (:) have the following properties:
Assumption 1. Ui (x) is continuous, diﬀerentiable and
dU
i(x)
dx < 0 for i = d;e





Assumption 1 simply means that both the donor and the elite prefer a project mix closer to their respective
target points, t and e. Assumption 2 ensures that the donor dislikes uncertainty.
from an expert is an element of information that the receiver may well choose to ignore and that does not directly aﬀect his payoﬀs.
53.2 Case A: The elite observes the donor’s signal
For illustrative purposes, we ﬁrst solve for the equilibrium in the game in the case that s is observed by E; i.e.
the elite group has full knowledge of any information that the donor agency has about the preferred project of the
target group.
At stage 3 of the game, the donor approves a project r if and only if
E





We can use this condition to compute a subset  (s)  [0;1] deﬁned as
 (s) =
n










The donor would accept the recommended project if and only if r 2  (s). Therefore, at stage 2 of the game,
under the assumption that s is observable to E, the elite group would recommend
r =





 = arg max
2(s)
Ue (j   ej) (4)
It follows that, if Ue (j   ej)  U









i.e. the elite always recommends a project that is just acceptable to the donor agency, provided that the elite group
prefers this project to its own outside option, and its own preferred project would be rejected by the agency.
Therefore, if the donor agency has no private information, then it can do no better than its own outside option
unless, unusually, full elite capture (i.e. selection of a project r = e) is better than its outside option.
Moreover, in the case where r is given by (5), it is easy to verify that, as the donor’s outside option improves,
the approved project moves closer to that preferred by the target population. We will see that this relationship
may be inverted when the elite does not observe the signal received by the donor.
3.3 Case B: The elite does not observe the donor’s signal
Next, we consider the more interesting case where the donor has private information about the preferred project of
the target population. As before, the donor would approve a project proposal r at stage 3 of the game if and only
if r 2  (s), where  (s) is as deﬁned in the previous section.
Without observing s, the elite cannot know what is the set  (s). However, he can compute Pr( 2  (s)jt)
for each  2 [0;1]. Therefore, at stage 2 of the game, he chooses r to maximise his expected utility as follows










 2  (s)jt
Ue (k   ek) + Pr
 
 = 2  (s)jt
U
e (7)
The trade-oﬀ described above is evident from (6) and (7): by recommending a project closer to e, the elite will
obviously improve its payoﬀ from project approval. However, by choosing a project further from t, he may lower
the probability that the project is approved by the donor.
We would like to know how this trade-oﬀ is aﬀected by the donor’s outside option and the quality of his
information about the preferred project of the target group. In particular, would the elite recommend a project
that is closer to that of the target group when the donor has better information or more attractive alternatives to
the proposal being considered? To answer these questions, we need to impose additional structure on the nature of
information in the model. This we do in the following section.
63.4 Imposing a structure on the donor’s signal
The idea underlying the donor’s signal is that the agency is able to gather information about the needs of the target
group, yet is never in a position to ascertain them in a completely reliable manner. For instance, he has a correct
perception of what the poor need in general, but cannot assess accurately how the nature of such needs varies from
one community to another. Such an assumption is warranted since it is precisely when the needs of the poor or
marginal groups are community-speciﬁc that participatory or decentralised development programmes are justiﬁed.
For the subsequent analysis, we assume that, through its own research into the community, independent of the
elite group, the donor agency is able to identify an interval of length 2m, in the unit interval, that contains t.
Without loss of generality, we take s to be the midpoint of this interval. Thus, given s and m, the interval
discovered by the donor, known to contain t, is given by
I (s;m) = [s   m;s + m] (8)
Note that, for the donor’s information to be valuable, we must have m < 1
2. An improvement in the quality of the
donor’s information would correspond to a decrease in m.
For each value of t, there is a range of possible values of s for which the interval deﬁned in (8) would contain
t. For ease of notation when referring to these ranges, we introduce the following functions:
a(;m) =





 + m if  < 1   2m
1   m otherwise (10)
Then, given t 2 [0;1], any signal s in the interval [a(t;m);b(t;m)] would be ‘feasible’ in the sense that I (s;m)
would be a subset of the unit interval and contain t.
We denote by fs (sjt;m) the p.d.f. of s conditional on t. By construction, the conditional distribution
has ﬁnite support over the interval [a(t;m);b(t;m)]. But its exact shape depends on the donor’s information
technology. For example, if, given t, any ‘feasible’ signal is equally probable, then fs (sjt;m) has a uniform
distribution over this interval. However, if the information gathering process is more likely to produce signals close
to the true value of t, then the distribution will be bell-shaped.
We denote by ft (t) the marginal p.d.f. of t. This function describes the common prior beliefs regarding the
value of t, known to both the elite and the donor. For the following analysis, we impose no additional structure
on the distribution functions except, where indicated, the following:
Assumption 3. fs (sjt;m) = (t;m)g (js   tj) if s 2 [a(t;m);b(t;m)] and fs (sjt;m) = 0 otherwise,




a(t;m) g (js   tj)ds
 1
.





, we have ft (t) = 0 for t < 2 m and t > 1   2 m.
Assumption 5. E (tjs;m) = s
Assumption 6. E

Ud (js   tj)js
> U
d
Assumption 3 says that conditional on t, the likelihood of diﬀerent signals depends on the distance of the signal
from t. Moreover, the conditions on the function g (:) implies that the conditional distribution fs (sjt;m) is
unimodal with its mode at t, and ensures that the elite’s optimisation problem is globally concave. The function
(t;m) simply ensures that the conditional probabilies add up to 1 as we vary the parameter m.
Assumption 4 says that extreme values of t are not possible. This assumption is convenient because if t is
very close to 0 or 1 then, given our information structure, this severely restricts the possible values that s can
take. For instance, if t = 0, then this is consistent only with the signal s = m. These cases lead to considerable
analytical complexity without providing any additional insights. Assumption 5 says that the distribution functions
ft (t) and fs (sjt;m) are such that when the donor receives a signal s, he expects that t is equal to s on
7average. Assumption 6 says that the donor would prefer to pursue a project which corresponds to its signal over
its outside option. The last assumption will be used to ensure that the set of possible projects that are acceptable
to the donor is monotonic in s.
Using Assumptions 3 and 4, the distribution of the donor’s beliefs given a signal s takes a relatively simple
form, described in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 3 and 4 and m <  m, the donor’s beliefs about the preferred project mix of
the targeted population, as expressed in the conditional distribution ft (tjs;m), is as follows: ft (tjs;m) =
^ (s;m)g (js   tj)ft (t) if t 2 [s   m;s + m] and ft (tjs;m) = 0 otherwise; where ^ (s;m) =
h +m
 m g (jxj)ft (x + s)dx
i 1
.
It is evident from Lemma 1 that the donor’s beliefs are directly related to his prior beliefs about t (as represented
by the marginal distribution ft (t)) and to the technology for generating the signal (which depends on the function
g (js   tj) as previously discussed). The term ^ (s;m) is a scaling factor which ensures that the conditional
probabilities, ft (tjs;m), add up to 1.
We have now completely deﬁned the nature of the donor’s signal and are now in a position to address the question
how the extent of elite capture varies with the donor’s outside option and the quality of the donor’s information.
3.5 Relationship between information quality, the donor’s outside option and the
donor’s tolerance
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, we can derive a number of useful characteristics of the donor’s expected utility from
a particular project mix which are summarised in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the expression E

Ud (k   tk)js
is maximised at some  2 (s   m;s + m),
is increasing in  for  <  and decreasing in  for  > . The set  (s;m;u) corresponds to the closed interval
[a (s;m;u);b (s;m;u)], where the functions a (:);b (:) > 0 are given implicitly by the following equations:
E

Ud (k   ak)js
= u;a <  (11)
E

Ud (k   bk)js
= u;b >  (12)
The functions a (s;m;u) and b (s;m;u) are deﬁned in such a way that if the donor receives a signal s (and
the quality of information and the outside option are given by parameters m and u), then the donor would accept
a project  if and only if it lies between a (s;m;u) and b (s;m;u). In the following discussion, we shall speak
about the "donor’s tolerance of elite capture" by which we mean some measure of the donor’s willingness to accept
a project recommendation when it deviates from its own received signal. The following deﬁnition provides a ranking
of the donor’s tolerance under diﬀerent parameter values:
Deﬁnition 1. We say that the donor is more tolerant for parameters (m1;u1) than for parameters (m2;u2) if
 (s;m2;u2)   (s;m1;u1) and  (s;m1;u1) 6=  (s;m2;u2). The concepts of less tolerant, increasing tolerance,
and decreasing tolerance are deﬁned accordingly.
We would like to know how the donor’s tolerance is aﬀected by the donor’s outside option, and the quality of
the donor’s information about t. This is the subject of the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 5 the donor’s tolerance of elite capture is decreasing in m and U
d.
The intuition behind Lemma 3 is as follows. By assumption, the donor is averse to uncertainty about the
distance between a recommended project and the preferred project of the target population. An increase in m
leads to increased uncertainty about t (more precisely, under Assumption 5, an ‘elementary increase in risk’), and
therefore increased uncertainty about the distance of any recommended project from t. Therefore, the donor is
more inclined to choose his outside option when m is larger. Similarly, for any given project mix, the donor is more
inclined to choose his outside option when U
d is larger. Both of these eﬀects translate into a decrease in the donor’s
tolerance.
83.6 The elite’s optimal response
Given the structure imposed on the donor’s information in Section 3.4, we can reconsider the strategic decision of
the elite group at stage 2 of the game. The optimal choice for the elite, as in the general case, is given by the solution
to the maximisation problem in (6). Using Lemma 2, we can rewrite the probability of any proposed project being
accepted by the donor as follows:
Pr
 
 2  (s)jt
= Pr
 
a (s)    b (s)jt
(where we suppress the variables m and u, which are assumed to be constant in this section, for ease of notation).
We can show that if f0
t (t) is small over its support, then under Assumptions 3-6, the functions a (s) and b (s)
are invertible (see Appendix B). Hence, we can deﬁne a (:) = 
 1
b (:) and b (:) =  1
a (:), and thus obtain
Pr
 
 2  (s)jt
= Pr
 















In words, a () and b () indicate the smallest and largest values of s for which the donor would accept the
project . For ease of exposition, and without loss of generality, we shift the utility of the elite group by a constant
such that U











Ue (k   ek) (14)
By varying , the elite can raise the probability that the recommended project is accepted by the donor, but this
may involve moving further from the elite group’s own preferred project mix. It should be clear that if the distance
between its own preferred project and those likely to be provided by the donor (represented by the set  (s)) is
very large, then the elite may be better oﬀ pursuing its outside option (which is equivalent to recommending a
project with zero probability of acceptance).
If not, we can show that, under Assumption 3, the elite’s optimal value of  lies between e and the mode
of the conditional distribution, t. The reason is as follows. Suppose e > t. Then, for any  > e, we have,
under Assumptions 1 and 3, that Ue (k   ek) < Ue (ke   ek) and Pr( 2  (s)) < Pr(e 2  (s)). So, the
elite would do better by choosing e than by choosing . For any  < t, we have, under Assumptions 1 and 3, that
Ue (k   ek) < Ue (kt   ek) and Pr( 2  (s)) < Pr(t 2  (s)). So the elite would do better oﬀ by choosing
t than by choosing . The same type of reasoning applies if e < t.
Furthermore, under Assumptions 2 and 3, the function V e (;e;t) is concave in  between e and t, and




















@ Pr( 2  (s)jt)
@
Ue (j   ej) + Pr
 
 2  (s)jt @Ue
@
= 0 (16)
Equation 15 completes our characterisation of the optimal strategy of the elite group. It contains the impor-
tant insight that the choice of the agent – in this case, the elite group – depends not only on the probability
Pr( 2  (s)jt), but also on how this probability changes with . Consequently, the donor’s outside option and
quality of the donor’s information aﬀect the extent of elite capture not only because they determine the donor’s





Intuitively, it would seem that if the donor had a stronger outside option or better quality information about
the preferences of the target population, then this would induce the elite to recommend a project closer to t and
thus lower elite capture. However, we shall see in the next section that this is not necessarily so.
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4.1 Comparative statics
We can deduce the eﬀect of an improvement in the donor’s outside option from the ﬁrst-order condition in (15) or
(16). According to Lemma 3, the donor’s tolerance declines with U
d. It follows that the probability that a project
 is accepted (denoted by the term Pr( 2  (s)jt)) also declines with U
d. From (16), we can see that this lowers
the elite’s reward from recommending a project close to e and therefore discourages elite capture.
But an increase in U




@ ). In particular, under Assumption 3, this slope becomes ﬂatter, and thus lowers the ‘marginal
cost’ (in the sense of a decrease in the probability of project acceptance) to the elite of recommending a project
further from t. This eﬀect goes in the opposite direction of the one mentioned earlier. We can summarise these
results in the form of the following proposition which is formally shown in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the eﬀect of an increase in the donor’s outside option on elite
capture is composed of two opposing eﬀects: (i) a decline in the donor’s tolerance, which discourages elite capture,
and (ii) decreased sensitivity of the likelihood of project acceptance to changes in the recommended project, which
encourages elite capture.
Under certain conditions, namely if the conditional density of s, fs (sjt) declines or rises sharply over some
interval, or if the elite gains little additional utility from capture beyond a certain point (i.e. @U
e
@ is small), then the
second eﬀect noted in Proposition 1 can dominate the ﬁrst. Consequently, an improvement in the donor’s outside
option can, paradoxically, lead to an increase in elite capture.
Next, consider how an improvement in the quality of the donor’s information would aﬀect elite capture. Ac-
cording to Lemma 3, the donor becomes more tolerant as the quality of information improves (i.e. as m declines).
Then, as we established previously, an increase in the donor’s tolerance would tend to increase the probability that
a project  is accepted, and thus encourage elite capture.
Improved tolerance also aﬀects how the probability of project acceptance changes with ; in particular, under
Assumption 3, it causes the slope to become steeper, and thus raises the ‘marginal cost’ (in the sense of a decrease in
the probability of project acceptance) to the elite of recommending a project further from t. This would discourage
elite capture.
As the quality of the donor’s information improves, the elite also becomes more conﬁdent about the actual signal
received by the donor. More precisely, according to Assumption 3, s has a smaller support and a higher density
around t as m declines. This has an ambiguous eﬀect on elite capture. But if the initial level of elite capture
is suﬃciently high, then we can show that this will discourage elite capture. The following proposition, formally
proven in Appendix A, summarises these results and provides the speciﬁc conditions.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1-6, and m <  m, the eﬀect of an increase in the quality of the donor’s informa-
tion (i.e. a decline in m) is composed of three eﬀects: (i) an increase in the donor’s tolerance, which encourages elite
capture, (ii) increased sensitivity of the likelihood of project acceptance to changes in the recommended project, which
discourages elite capture, and (iii) increased accuracy in the donor’s signal (and the elite’s perception of it), which,
if the initial level of elite capture is suﬃciently high (speciﬁcally [a (r;m;u);b (r;m;u)]   [a(t;m);b(t;m)]
and Pr(r 2  (s)jt) < 1
2), discourages elite capture.
4.2 Discussion
The above result looks counter-intuitive. The intuition suggests, indeed, that higher tolerance or laxity on the
part of a donor agency should incite the elite to take advantage of it by making a project proposal closer to their
own preference. This prediction is obviously correct when the elite know with certainty the information that the
donor has acquired about the preference of the group targeted by the aid programme. This is the case in which the
elite observe the donor’s signal. The greater the tolerance of the donor regarding the distance between the project
proposal and his signal (that is, the donor’s idea about what the targeted group prefers), the more the elite will
choose to propose a project that departs from this signal.
10However, as soon as one considers a situation in which the donor’s signal is not precisely known by the elite
(instead of being ﬁxed, the domain of project acceptability is sliding along the rail of possible values of the project
mix), so that the latter cannot know for sure whether their proposal will be accepted or rejected, the prediction
may be invalidated. The key point is that greater tolerance of the donor manifests itself on both sides of the signal
received: the domain of project acceptance extends itself to the right and to the left of the point corresponding
to this signal. Since the probability of project acceptance is always higher in the area closer to the target group’s
preferred project, the eﬀect of this extension is to create a larger potential for increasing the acceptance probability
by moving closer to the target group’s preferred project rather than moving in the opposite direction. Such a
pro-poor move has the evident consequence of decreasing the elite’s intrinsic utility derived from the project, but
our result shows that the net eﬀect may be favourable.
The argument can be easily illustrated with the help of a simple version of the problem as depicted in Figure 1
below. The graph shows the elite’s beliefs regarding the distribution of s, the signal received by the donor for a
particular realisation of t. Suppose the quality of the donor’s information and the donor’s outside option are such
that the elite recommends the project mix r shown in the ﬁgure (r is larger than t but smaller than e). The
points a and b denote, respectively, the smallest and largest values of s for which the donor would approve the
recommendation r.
What would happen if the donor now becomes more tolerant (which, according to Lemma 3, occurs if his outside
option becomes weaker or the quality of his information improves) ? The points 0
a and 0
b in the ﬁgure denote the
smallest and largest values of s for which the donor would approve of r following such a change. Greater tolerance
implies that 0
a < a and 0
b > b.
The elite now enjoys a higher probability of project acceptance if he recommends r (the probability is now
represented by the area under the curve between 0
a and 0
b as opposed to the area between a and b before
the change). This higher probability would increase the temptation of elite capture and encourage the elite to
recommend a project mix even higher than r. This eﬀect matches our intuition.
But it is important to note that whenever the elite adjusts the recommendation towards his own preferred point,
the probability that it will be accepted by the donor declines. And the marginal decline is greater when the donor
is more tolerant. Visually, this can be veriﬁed by observing that the distance between the heights x0 and y0 is
greater than that between x and y. This increased sensitivity of the probability of acceptance to changes in the
recommended project mix would lower the temptation of elite capture and encourage the elite to recommend a
project mix lower than r. This eﬀect lies at the heart of the paradox highlighted in this paper.
It should be evident from the ﬁgure that if the probability curve is suﬃciently steep in the interval [0
a;0
b] (and






















Figure 1: The eﬀect of increased donor’s tolerance on the probability of project acceptance
5 Conclusion
Participatory development is highly vulnerable to the risk of elite capture. Among the two main forms of elite
capture, embezzlement and information distortion, the latter has been best documented empirically and worked
out theoretically. However, the inﬂuence of the elite is typically assumed to exert itself through the local collective
decision-making process without the donor being able to constrain it. In this contribution, we have followed a
diﬀerent approach in which the donor pursues the explicit objective of poverty alleviation and has an imprecise idea
of what the priorities of the poor look like. This idea can only be guessed by the elite. The donor also exhibits a
certain degree of tolerance regarding the distance between his signal and the actual proposal made by the elite on
behalf of the poor. The elite then face a trade-oﬀ between two types of considerations: the probability of acceptance
of their project proposal by the donor, on the one hand, and its degree of congruence with their own preference, on
the other hand.
In this particular framework, a paradoxical result may obtain. An improvement in the donor’s outside option that
results, say, from reduced competition between donors for access to target communities, may end up encouraging
elite capture. Similarly, an improvement in the quality of the donor’s information about the poor’s preference may
induce the elite to propose a project that is farther away from the poor’s preferred outcome.
It bears emphasis that this sort of paradoxical eﬀect is not a mere curiosity arising in the speciﬁc context of
donor-elite strategic relations. It has a much wider scope since it can be obtained in other principal-agent settings
exhibiting characteristics similar to those mentioned above. Revealingly, Putterman (1987) and Putterman and
Skillman (1988) have shown, in the context of sharecropping contracts, that diﬀerent assumptions regarding the
information available to a principal who monitors the work of a worker lead to diﬀerent responses of labor eﬀort to
monitoring. In some cases, the worker will in fact exert less eﬀort when the monitoring improves.
Since the paradox is now well understood on the theoretical plane, research eﬀort should be devoted to gathering
empirical evidence on whether and under what circumstances it arises. In particular, one would like to know to
what extent the mis-targeting of aid resources is attributable to the sort of information distortion analysed in this
paper.
126 Appendix A










0 fs (sj)ft ()d
(17)
By construction, if  = 2 [s   m;s + m], then s = 2 [a(;m);b(;m)]. By Assumption 3, if s = 2 [a(t);b(t)],













s m fs(sj)ft()d if t 2 [s   m;s + m]
0 otherwise
(18)





(t;m)g (jt   sj)ft (t)
 s+m










g (js   j)ds
# 1
(20)







If m <  m, then, using Assumption 4, we have ft (t) = 0 whenever t = 2 [2m;1   2m]. Therefore, we have
either (;m) = 0 (when t 2 [2m;1   2m]) or ft (t) = 0 (when t = 2 [2m;1   2m]). Thus, we can write





0g (jt   sj)ft (t)
 s+m
s m 0g (j   sj)ft ()d
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 s+m
s m g (j   sj)ft ()d




g (j   sj)ft ()d =
 +m
 m










 ^ (s;m)g (jt   sj)ft (t) if t 2 [s   m;s + m]
0 otherwise








































Note that, if   s   m, then the right-hand side of (22) is greater than or equal to zero. If   s + m,
then the right-hand side of (22) is less than or equal to zero. So, the optimal value of  lies in the interval
































By Assumption 1, the ﬁrst integral is negative and the second integral is positive. We wish to show that, as 
increases, the ﬁrst integral becomes more negative while the ﬁrst integral becomes less positive. Diﬀerentiating











































































Ud (k   tk)js




Ud (k   tk)js
is monotonically decreasing in  in the interval (s   m;s + m). Therefore, there ex-
ists a unique value  2 (s   m;s + m) such that d
dE

Ud (k   tk)js
= 0. Moreover, d
dE

Ud (k   tk)js
?
0 for  7 . It follows that the expression E

Ud (k   tk)js
is maximised at  = , is increasing in  for
 <  and decreasing in  for  > . Therefore, the set  (s), deﬁned by (2), is a closed interval. Therefore,
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V d (;s;m) = E
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~ Ud (s + m;) + ~ Ud (s   m;)
i
Note that if E (tjs) = s, then an increase in m constitutes an ‘elementary increase in risk’4. Note also
that an ‘elementary increase in risk’ implies secondary-order stochastic dominance (Mas-Collel, Whinston
and Green, 1995; chapter 6). Therefore, if the donor’s utility function is strictly concave (Assumption 2) and
















where b (:) is as deﬁned in the statement of Lemma 2. Diﬀerentiating throughout (30) w.r.t. m, we obtain












@ < 0. Therefore, using (29) and (31), we obtain @b
@m < 0. Similarly, we can
show that @b
@m > 0. It follows that  (s;m2;u)   (s;m1;u) and  (s;m2;u) 6=  (s;m1;u) for m2 > m1.
Therefore, the donor’s tolerance of elite capture is decreasing in m.












@ < 0, we obtain, using (32), that @b
@Ud < 0. Similarly, we can show that @a
@Ud > 0. It
follows that  (s;m;u2)   (s;m;u1) and  (s;m;u2) 6=  (s;m;u1) for u2 > u1. Therefore, the donor’s
tolerance of elite capture is decreasing in U
d.
4. Proof of Proposition 1: By construction, b (;m;u) is decreasing and a (;m;u) is increasing in u. If e > t,
then, by Assumption 3, f0
s (:jt) < 0 for  2 (t;e). Therefore, we have [fs (b (;m;u)jt)   fs (a (;m;u)jt)]
increasing in u (i.e. becoming less negative) for  2 (t;e). From the ﬁrst term in (15), it is evident that this
lowers the cost to the elite of choosing a higher value of . However, the term [Fs (b (;m;u)jt)   Fs (a (;m;u)jt)]
is decreasing in u. From the second term in (15), this decreases the reward to the elite of choosing a higher
of .
If e < t, then, by Assumption 3, f0
s (:jt) > 0 for  2 (e;t). Therefore, we have
[fs (b (;m;u)jt)   fs (a (;m;u)jt)] decreasing in u (i.e. becoming less positive) for  2 (e;t). From
(15), this lowers the cost to the elite of choosing a lower value of . However, as previously mentioned, the
term[Fs (b (;m;u)jt)   Fs (a (;m;u)jt)] is decreasing in u. From (15), this decreases the reward to the
elite of choosing a lower value of .
5. Proof of Proposition 2: For analytical clarity, denote by m1 the parameter which determines the elite’s
perception of the donor’s tolerance; and denote by m2 the parameter which determines the elite’s beliefs about
s. Thus we write the tolerance interval as [a (t;m1;u);b (t;m1;u)]; and the conditional distribution as
fs (sjt;m2). If the elite has full knowledge about any improvement in the quality of the donor’s information,
then this will of course imply a decline in both m1 and m2.
(i) & (ii) Following the reasoning in the proof of Lemma 3, we have b (;m1;u) is decreasing and a (;m1;u)
is increasing in m1. If e > t, then, by Assumption 3, f0
s (:jt) < 0 for  2 (t;e). Therefore, we have
4Given two lotteries deﬁned by the distributions F (:) and G(:), we say that ’G(:) constitutes an elementary increase in risk from
F (:) if G(:) is generated from F (:) by taking all the mass that F (:) assigns to an interval [x0;x00] and transferring it to the endpoints
x0 and x00 in such a manner that the mean is preserved.’ Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), page 198.
15[fs (b (;m1;u)jt;m2)   fs (a (;m1;u)jt;m2)] increasing in m1 (i.e. becoming less negative) for  2
(t;e). From the ﬁrst term in (15), it is evident that, as m1 declines, this raises the cost to the elite
of choosing a higher value of . However, the term [Fs (b (;m1;u)jt;m2)   Fs (a (;m1;u)jt;m2)] is
decreasing in m1. From the second term in (15), it follows that, as m1 declines, this increases the reward to
the elite of choosing a higher of .
Following the reasoning in the proof of Proposition 1, it can be shown that the same incentives are present
when e < t.
(iii)(a) Consider, ﬁrst, the case where e > t. And suppose the values of ;t;m1;m2 and u are such that



































Using Assumption 4, we have t 2 [2 m;1   2 m]. Since we have also assumed that m2 <  m, this implies




t m2 g (js   tj)ds
i 1
, which implies that (t;m2) is decreasing in m2. Since

















  b   t 
  g
  a   t 
> 0
Thus, a decline in m2 (i.e. an improvement in the quality of the donor’s information) would cause the
probability of project acceptance to fall more sharply with increasing . Similarly, we can show that if
b (;m1;u) > b(t;m2) and a (;m1;u) 2 [a(t;m2);b(t;m2)], then
d
dm2 [fs (bjt;m2)   fs (ajt;m2)] = d
dm2 [ fs (ajt;m2)] > 0. If b (;m1;u) > b(t;m2) and a (;m1;u) <
a(t;m2), then d
dm2 [fs (bjt;m2)   fs (ajt;m2)] = 0. Note that we cannot have a (;m1;u) < a(t;m2)
and b (;m1;u) 2 [a(t;m2);b(t;m2)], because, in this case, given that e > t, an increase in  would
both increase the probability of acceptance and the utility to the elite from the recommended project mix.
Furthermore, if the initial level of elite capture is suﬃciently high, we must have b (;m1;u) > b(t;m2)
and a (;m1;u) 2 [a(t;m2);b(t;m2)]. We argued previously that, given m <  m and Assumption 4,
b(t;m2) = t + m2. Then
Pr
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a(;m1;u) g (js   tj)ds
 t+m2
t m2 g (js   tj)ds
Therefore,



























 2  (s)jt;m2

16Therefore, if the probability of acceptance is initially below 1
2, then this probability is increasing in m2.
Then, a decline in m2 would cause this probability to decrease, and therefore decrease the marginal reward
of recommending a project  further from t.
In sum, if e > t, the initial level of elite capture is suﬃciently high, and the probability of project acceptance
is below 1
2, then a decrease in m2 would discourage elite capture.
(iii)(b) Next, consider the case where e < t. And suppose the values of t;m1;m2 and u are such that
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b   t 
  g
  a   t 
> 0
Thus, a decline in m2 (i.e. an improvement in the quality of the donor’s information) would cause the probabil-
ity of project acceptance to fall more sharply with decreasing . Similarly, we can show that, if a (;m1;u) <
a(t;m2) and b (;m1;u) 2 [a(t;m2);b(t;m2)], then d
dm2 [fs (bjt;m2)   fs (ajt;m2)] = d
dm2 [fs (bjt;m2)] >
0. If b (;m1;u) > b(t;m2) and a (;m1;u) < a(t;m2), then d
dm2 [fs (bjt;m2)   fs (ajt;m2)] = 0.
Note that we cannot have b (;m1;u) > b(t;m2) and a (;m1;u) 2 [a(t;m2);b(t;m2)], because, in this
case, given that e < t, a decrease in  would both increase the probability of acceptance and the utility to
the elite from the recommended project mix.
Furthermore, if the initial level of elite capture is suﬃciently high, we must have a (;m1;u) < a(t;m2)
and b (;m1;u) 2 [a(t;m2);b(t;m2)]. We argued previously that, given m <  m and Assumption 4,
a(t;m2) = t   m2. Then
Pr
 
 2  (s)jt;m2

















t m2 g (js   tj)ds
 t+m2
t m2 g (js   tj)ds
Therefore,





























 2  (s)jt;m2

Therefore, once again, if the probability of acceptance is initially below 1
2, then this probability is increasing
in m2. Then, a decline in m2 would cause this probability to decrease, and therefore decrease the marginal
reward of recommending a project  further from t.
In sum, if e < t, the initial level of elite capture is suﬃciently high, and the probability of project acceptance
is below 1
2, then a decrease in m2 would discourage elite capture.
177 Appendix B
In this appendix, we show that the a (s) and b (s) are monotonically increasing in s, and therefore the inverse
of these functions exist. By construction,
E
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ft (s + mjs) = ^ (s)g (jmj)ft (s + m)





ds is suﬃciently small, then the right-hand side of (33) should have the same sign as

Ud (js + m   j)   Ud (js   m   j)
 ^ (s)g (jmj)ft (s + m) (34)
If  > s, then, using Assumption 1, Ud (js + m   j) > Ud (js   m   j). Then, the expression in (34) is greater
than zero. Then, E

Ud (jt   j)js
is increasing in s. From Assumption 6 and the deﬁnition of b (s), it
follows that b (s) > s. Therefore, E

Ud (jt   b (s)j)js + "

> U
d for some small increment " > 0. It follows
that b (s + ") > b (s). Thus, b (s) is monotonically increasing in s. Similarly, we can show that a (s) is
monotonically increasing in s. Therefore, the inverse of the functions a (s) and b (s) exist.
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